Key judgement
The continent's largest country faces several threats at once: Boko Haram and ISWAP in the north-east, banditry and mass kidnapping in the north-west, separatist violence in the south-east and crime in the Gulf of Guinea.
Threat context
- Boko Haram and ISWAP attacks in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa.
- Armed bandits carrying out mass kidnappings in Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna and Niger states.
- IPOB-linked enforcement of sit-at-home orders and attacks in the south-east.
- Kidnap for ransom on highways nationwide, and maritime crime in the Niger Delta.
Vulnerabilities
- Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Nigeria's main urban centres.
- Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
- Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
- Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.
Exposure
- Staff in Abuja, Lagos and Port Harcourt.
- Humanitarian operations in Maiduguri and the north-east.
- Road movement between cities.
Operational implications
- Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
- Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
- Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.
Rated risks
- Kidnap for ransom on road movement, likelihood 4/5, impact 5/5. Air travel between cities; escorted road movement.
- Attack in the north-east, likelihood 4/5, impact 5/5. Humanitarian air service and garrison-town footprint.
- Crime in Lagos and Port Harcourt, likelihood 3/5, impact 3/5. Residence security and vetted transport.
Mitigation
- Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
- Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
- Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
- Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
- Air travel between cities; escorted road movement.
- Humanitarian air service and garrison-town footprint.
- Residence security and vetted transport.
Residual risk
SEVERE nationally; CRITICAL in parts of the north-east and north-west.
Confidence and sources
Confidence: Moderate, consistent open-source reporting, limited independent verification outside main cities.. Usually reliable public sources; individual incident reports may be single-source.
- ACLED conflict event data
- UN OCHA situation reports and ReliefWeb country pages
- UN Security Council and panel-of-experts reporting
- UK FCDO and US State Department travel advice
- National and regional media monitoring
Analyst assessment from public sources, Reviewed October 2026. Not a substitute for an organisation's own assessment.