Early warning is a set of indicators, watched deliberately

Vulnerability

• Any fixed, identifiable premises holding fuel, vehicles or commodities is a looting target regardless of flag or signage.
• Front lines move; movement plans built on last week's control map are wrong.
• Cross-line movement requires permission from more than one party, and each permission can be withdrawn.
• National staff and their families remain in place when international staff relocate, carrying the residual exposure.

Exposure

• Khartoum State, Darfur states and Kordofan, where ground fighting and air attack have been concentrated.
• Port Sudan and eastern Sudan as the main entry, logistics and relocation route.
• Cross-line and cross-border convoy movement, including from Chad and South Sudan.

Impact

• Death and serious injury of staff, including from indirect fire with no attack directed at the organisation at all.
• Total loss of assets, stock and premises through looting, and loss of the capacity to deliver at all in an area.
• Prolonged detention of staff, and severe welfare consequences for national staff and their dependants.

Mitigation

• Programme criticality review: agree in writing which activities justify presence, and stop the rest.
• Minimum footprint, no fuel or vehicle stockpiles at staffed premises; disperse stock; keep cash holdings low and documented.
• Cross-line movement only with permissions from every relevant party, confirmed the same day, with a no-go default.
• National staff support built in from the start: relocation options, salary continuity, family contact arrangements, and a decision about what is owed if international staff withdraw.
• Explosive-ordnance awareness briefing for all staff, route clearance information from mine-action actors, and a rule against entering unswept damaged buildings.
• Relocation and hibernation plans written, resourced and rehearsed, with trigger indicators agreed before they are needed.

Assessed risks

• Staff killed or injured by indirect fire or air attack in a contested urban area L4 × I5
• Armed looting of premises, vehicles or warehoused stock L5 × I4
• Detention or interrogation of staff at a checkpoint or cross-line crossing L4 × I4
• Death or injury from explosive remnants of war in an area fighting has passed through L3 × I5
• National staff and dependants left exposed after international relocation L4 × I4

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Burkina Faso's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso.
• Road movement outside the capital, and humanitarian air access to besieged towns.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Use humanitarian air service where possible; no unassessed road travel.
• Minimise expatriate footprint outside the capital.
• Maintain clear registration and neutral communications.

Assessed risks

• Mass-casualty attack or ambush on road movement L5 × I5
• Kidnapping of foreign staff L4 × I5
• Expulsion or suspension by authorities L3 × I4

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Cameroon's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Yaoundé and Douala.
• Humanitarian operations in Bamenda, Buea and Maroua.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Low-profile, assessed movement and observance of lockdowns.
• Escorted movement and restricted footprint.
• Basic briefings.

Assessed risks

• Kidnapping in the Anglophone regions L4 × I5
• Attack in the Far North L4 × I5
• Crime in Douala L3 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Central African Republic's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Bangui and humanitarian hubs (Bambari, Bria, Bossangoa).
• Road movement between hubs.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Convoy discipline and humanitarian air service.
• Route assessment and UN advisories.
• Hibernation stocks and safe rooms.

Assessed risks

• Attack or robbery of convoys L4 × I4
• Explosive device on roads L3 × I5
• Clashes near humanitarian bases L3 × I4

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Chad's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in N'Djamena and humanitarian hubs in the east (Abéché, Adré).
• Road movement in the east and Lake region.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Escorted or no movement in the Lake region.
• Daylight movement in convoy with check-ins.
• Hibernation plan and stocks.

Assessed risks

• Attack in the Lake Chad region L4 × I5
• Armed banditry on eastern roads L4 × I4
• Unrest in N'Djamena L3 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside DR Congo's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Kinshasa, Goma, Bukavu and Bunia.
• Road movement in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Relocation triggers and hibernation stocks.
• Assessed movement, escorts and short check-ins.
• Monitor events and avoid diplomatic districts during protests.

Assessed risks

• Caught in front-line fighting in the Kivus L4 × I5
• Ambush or kidnapping on roads in the east L4 × I5
• Unrest in Kinshasa L3 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Libya's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata, often in compounds.
• Road and air movement between east and west, and travel to the south.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Maintain hibernation stocks and a tested relocation plan.
• Low-profile movement with trusted local fixers and short check-ins.
• Hold cash, fuel and power contingencies.

Assessed risks

• Caught in armed clashes in Tripoli L4 × I4
• Kidnapping or arbitrary detention L3 × I5
• Collapse of power, fuel or banking services L3 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Mali's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Bamako.
• Road movement on main supply routes, and air access to northern towns.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Fuel, cash and hibernation stocks; relocation triggers.
• Minimal expatriate movement outside Bamako.
• Air movement where possible.

Assessed risks

• Attack or blockade affecting Bamako L4 × I5
• Kidnapping L4 × I5
• Ambush on road movement L5 × I5

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Mozambique's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Maputo, Pemba and Nampula.
• Operations in Cabo Delgado, including LNG areas.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Restrict movement to assessed areas and maintain relocation plans.
• Hibernation plan.
• Low profile and varied routines.

Assessed risks

• Insurgent attack in Cabo Delgado L4 × I5
• Unrest in Maputo L3 × I3
• Kidnap for ransom L3 × I4

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Niger's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Niamey.
• Road movement in Tillabéri, Tahoua and Diffa.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Escorted or air movement only.
• Minimise expatriate footprint.
• Maintain registration and relationships.

Assessed risks

• Attack on road movement in the west L5 × I5
• Kidnapping L4 × I5
• Suspension by authorities L3 × I4

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Nigeria's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Abuja, Lagos and Port Harcourt.
• Humanitarian operations in Maiduguri and the north-east.
• Road movement between cities.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Air travel between cities; escorted road movement.
• Humanitarian air service and garrison-town footprint.
• Residence security and vetted transport.

Assessed risks

• Kidnap for ransom on road movement L4 × I5
• Attack in the north-east L4 × I5
• Crime in Lagos and Port Harcourt L3 × I3

Vulnerability

• Predictable routines: fixed arrival and departure times, single approach roads, and repeated use of the same hotels and meeting venues.
• Premises with limited stand-off from a public road, and guarding contracted without a written security standard.
• Movement approved on the basis of habit rather than a route assessment, with no written abort criteria held by the vehicle commander.
• Reliance on a single communications channel, and check-in schedules that would take hours to reveal a missing vehicle.

Exposure

• National and international staff in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo, Garowe and Hargeisa, largely during working hours with visitor traffic on set days.
• Road movement on the Mogadishu–Afgooye, Mogadishu–Jowhar and Baidoa corridors, and airport transfers through areas used by officials.
• Distribution and monitoring visits in rural districts where control changes between towns.

Impact

• Fatalities and serious injury from blast and fragmentation, with prolonged staff-care and family-liaison obligations.
• Loss of a vehicle or team to abduction, with months of crisis management and no guarantee of outcome.
• Programme suspension, contractual failure with donors, and loss of the community acceptance that makes access possible.

Mitigation

• Site selection with measurable stand-off, controlled single entry with search, blast film, a designated safe room and a drill rhythm that is actually run.
• Journey management per movement: route assessment, varied timing and routing, day-of-travel road check, named vehicle commander and written abort criteria.
• Checkpoint mapping with transporters, a documented no-payment position, scripted responses and one named negotiation point of contact.
• Crisis management plan rehearsed with named roles, tested contact tree, and a decision log kept from the first hour.
• Acceptance work: transparent selection criteria, community feedback channels, and a public position on independence that partners can repeat.

Assessed risks

• Staff caught in the effects of an explosive attack on a nearby government, security or hotel target L4 × I5
• Ambush or roadside device against vehicle movement on an inter-city corridor L3 × I5
• Detention, extortion or long delay at an informal checkpoint L4 × I3
• Abduction of staff for ransom or leverage L2 × I5

Vulnerability

• Field bases with limited perimeter control, and guarding arrangements that would not withstand an armed group.
• Movement dependent on a small number of roads that are impassable in the wet season, forcing air or river movement with different risks.
• Medical capability far from field bases, making an ordinary injury a serious event.
• Insufficient female staff representation in security decision-making, and reporting routes that discourage disclosure.

Exposure

• Field bases and mobile teams in Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile, Warrap and the Equatorias.
• Road movement in the dry season, river movement on the Nile corridor, and air movement to airstrips with no security at the receiving end.
• Distribution sites where large crowds gather and armed actors are present nearby.

Impact

• Death and serious injury of staff from ambush, crossfire and armed robbery.
• Sexual violence, with severe and lasting harm and an organisational duty that extends for years.
• Suspension of delivery in the areas with the greatest need, and asset loss that removes capacity for the season.

Mitigation

• Journey management with seasonal planning: pre-positioned stock before the rains, and no reliance on a single route or mode.
• Site standards written into guarding contracts, with perimeter, lighting, access control and a rehearsed lock-down.
• Explicit sexual-violence risk assessment and controls: accommodation arrangements, movement pairing, trained focal points, confidential reporting and survivor-centred support.
• Medical capability mapped before deployment: first-aid trained staff on every movement, documented referral, and a named provider for escalation.
• Community acceptance work at distribution sites, crowd-management planning, and a documented position on interference in selection and recruitment.

Assessed risks

• Ambush or armed robbery against a road or river movement L4 × I4
• Staff caught in communal or subnational armed violence near a field base L4 × I4
• Sexual violence against a staff member L3 × I5
• Serious medical emergency at a location distant from adequate care L3 × I5
• Armed or administrative interference in selection, procurement or recruitment L4 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Benin's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Cotonou and Porto-Novo.
• Travel to Atacora and Alibori.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Treat border park areas as no-go.
• Authority-coordinated travel only.
• Monitor the electoral calendar.

Assessed risks

• Attack in the northern parks L4 × I5
• Kidnapping in the north L3 × I5
• Election-related unrest L2 × I3

Vulnerability

• Programmes designed around road movement between regional capitals, where control is not continuous.
• Reliance on mobile networks and internet for check-ins, in a context where shutdowns are used as a control measure.
• National staff exposed to identity-based pressure at checkpoints, with no written protocol for what they may and may not carry.
• Access negotiated informally with local authorities rather than through a documented, escalatable arrangement.

Exposure

• Field offices and monitoring visits in Amhara, Oromia, Afar and the Tigray periphery.
• Long-distance road movement, including night arrival at regional towns where curfews change with little notice.
• Addis-based staff and visitors, whose day-to-day exposure is far lower but who may travel at short notice.

Impact

• Staff injury or death from crossfire, roadside devices and armed robbery on regional roads.
• Abduction of staff for ransom, with a real prospect of long negotiation.
• Loss of programme continuity where access is withheld, and loss of situational awareness during communications shutdowns.

Mitigation

• Region-specific movement rules rather than a single country policy: separate approval levels for Amhara, Oromia, Afar and Tigray-periphery travel.
• No night road movement; arrival deadlines set with daylight margin; overnight stops planned, not improvised.
• Communications redundancy, satellite messenger or radio where networks are unreliable, with a documented no-contact procedure.
• Written protocol for national staff at checkpoints, agreed with them, covering documentation, questioning and what to do if separated.
• Access agreements documented at the level that can enforce them, with an escalation route when local permission is withdrawn.

Assessed risks

• Staff caught in armed confrontation or crossfire during regional road movement L3 × I5
• Abduction for ransom on an Amhara or Oromia road corridor L3 × I5
• Loss of contact with a field team during a communications shutdown L4 × I3
• Access withdrawn or permissions withheld, suspending delivery L4 × I3
• Identity-based pressure or detention of national staff at a checkpoint L3 × I4

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Guinea's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Conakry.
• Mining areas in Boké and Simandou.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Avoid the Axe road on protest days.
• Secure transport and accommodation.
• Hibernation plan and stocks.

Assessed risks

• Caught in protest violence L3 × I4
• Crime L3 × I3
• Sudden political disruption L3 × I3

Vulnerability

• Routine, predictable movement patterns in Nairobi, and reliance on a small number of well-known venues.
• North-eastern field movement planned as domestic travel rather than as a cross-border threat environment.
• Driver standards and vehicle maintenance treated as a fleet matter rather than a security control.
• No agreed thresholds for pausing movement during protest activity, leaving the decision to individuals in the moment.

Exposure

• Nairobi offices, accommodation, hotels and conference venues, and Mombasa coastal operations.
• Field movement and camp operations in Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Dadaab and the Lamu hinterland.
• Long-distance road movement on the Nairobi–Mombasa, Nairobi–Garissa and northern corridors.

Impact

• Casualties from an attack on a soft target or a roadside device in the north-east.
• Injury or death in a road traffic collision, statistically the most likely serious harm.
• Programme disruption and reputational consequences from an incident involving staff during unrest.

Mitigation

• Two-tier movement policy: separate approval, vehicle and communications standards for north-eastern and coastal-hinterland travel.
• Road safety treated as a security control, driver assessment, defensive driving, speed limits, vehicle checks, seatbelt discipline and a night-travel ban.
• Protest thresholds written down: what triggers a movement pause, who decides, and what staff do if caught out.
• Urban crime controls: vetted transport, arrival and departure procedures, low-value carry, and a briefing that is repeated rather than issued once.
• Venue selection criteria for meetings and conferences, and short exposure at high-profile locations.

Assessed risks

• Roadside device or ambush affecting movement in Garissa, Wajir, Mandera or the Lamu hinterland L3 × I5
• Attack on a soft target used by staff in Nairobi or Mombasa L2 × I5
• Road traffic collision during staff movement L4 × I4
• Violent urban crime, including carjacking or express abduction L3 × I4
• Staff caught in protest or public-order response L3 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Madagascar's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Antananarivo and southern regions.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Hibernation plan.
• Daylight convoy movement.
• Seasonal plans.

Assessed risks

• Political unrest L3 × I3
• Banditry on rural roads L3 × I4
• Cyclone disruption L3 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Mauritania's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou.
• Humanitarian operations at Mbera camp in the south-east.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Restrict travel near the border.
• Authority-coordinated desert travel.
• Vetted drivers and daylight-only travel.

Assessed risks

• Border incident near Mali L3 × I4
• Kidnapping in remote areas L2 × I5
• Road traffic accidents on long routes L4 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside South Africa's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Secure transport, vehicle discipline and residence security.
• Monitor events and maintain hibernation stocks.
• Backup power and water.

Assessed risks

• Carjacking or armed robbery L4 × I4
• Unrest disruption L3 × I3
• Infrastructure outage L3 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Togo's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Lomé.
• Travel to Savanes.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Treat the far north as no-go without escort.
• Monitor events.
• Follow maritime security advice.

Assessed risks

• Attack in Savanes L4 × I5
• Protest disruption L2 × I3
• Maritime crime L2 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Western Sahara's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Travel to Laayoune and Dakhla, largely permissive.
• Any movement near the berm or into the buffer strip.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Stay on known roads; avoid the berm.
• Brief staff on sensitivities.
• Treat the berm area as no-go.

Assessed risks

• Landmine or ordnance incident L2 × I5
• Expulsion or detention linked to political activity L3 × I3
• Exposure to cross-berm fire L2 × I5

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Algeria's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff based in Algiers, Oran and Constantine, mostly in permissive conditions.
• Travel to hydrocarbon sites and southern wilayas, which requires official coordination and escort.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Restrict southern travel to escorted, authority-coordinated movement.
• Brief staff on permits and restrictions before travel.
• Monitor local media and avoid gatherings.

Assessed risks

• Attack or kidnapping in the southern border regions L2 × I5
• Detention linked to permits, photography or sensitive topics L2 × I3
• Disruption from protests in northern cities L2 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Angola's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Luanda.
• Travel to Cabinda and the Lunda diamond provinces.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Secure transport and residences.
• Avoid gatherings.
• Authority-coordinated travel.

Assessed risks

• Violent crime L3 × I3
• Protest violence L2 × I3
• Cabinda incident L2 × I4

Vulnerability

• National staff carrying the political exposure of the organisation's work with no protocol for questioning or detention.
• Movement plans that depend on fuel availability and roads that degrade seasonally.
• Reliance on Bujumbura medical capability with no documented referral for serious cases.
• Assessments and beneficiary data held in ways that could be read as politically significant.

Exposure

• Bujumbura offices, accommodation and staff movement.
• Field operations in provinces near the DRC and Rwandan borders.
• National staff and local partners, whose exposure continues after international staff leave.

Impact

• Injury from grenade or armed incident, and casualties from road traffic collision on poor roads.
• Detention or questioning of national staff, with severe personal and family consequences.
• Loss of operating permission, and interruption of delivery through fuel or access failure.

Mitigation

• Written protocol for questioning and detention agreed with national staff, with legal support and family liaison named in advance.
• Movement planning around fuel and road condition, with journey approval and a night-travel ban.
• Medical referral pathway documented in advance, including regional escalation for serious cases.
• Data minimisation and secure handling for assessments and beneficiary information.
• Compliance and registration kept current, with a documented, non-political public position on the work.

Assessed risks

• Grenade or armed incident affecting staff or premises L2 × I4
• Questioning or detention of national staff over the organisation's work L3 × I4
• Road traffic collision or breakdown on poor roads or during fuel shortage L4 × I3
• Serious medical emergency without adequate local care L3 × I4
• Loss of operating permission or administrative restriction L3 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Comoros's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Moroni.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Monitor events.
• Seasonal plans.

Assessed risks

• Political unrest L2 × I3
• Cyclone L2 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Congo's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Basic briefings.
• Assess travel to Pool.

Assessed risks

• Crime L3 × I2
• Pool incident L2 × I4

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Côte d'Ivoire's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Abidjan and Yamoussoukro.
• Travel to northern border districts.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Restrict travel near the borders.
• Vetted transport and residence security.
• Hibernation plan around elections.

Assessed risks

• Northern border incident L2 × I5
• Crime in Abidjan L3 × I3
• Election unrest L3 × I3

Vulnerability

• Predictable use of a small number of hotels, restaurants and offices frequented by internationals.
• Work and movement schedules that ignore the heat cycle, particularly for drivers, guards and field staff.
• Assumption that a stable base needs no security plan, leaving no incident procedure when something does happen.
• Sea and port operations planned without reference to maritime security advisories.

Exposure

• Djibouti City offices, accommodation and venues used by international staff.
• Port, corridor and warehouse operations, and the Djibouti–Addis Ababa road and rail corridor.
• Coastal and maritime activity in the Bab al-Mandab approaches.

Impact

• Casualties from an attack on a venue frequented by foreigners, however low the likelihood.
• Heat illness and preventable deaths among outdoor and vehicle-based staff.
• Corridor and port disruption cascading into supply failure for programmes in Ethiopia and the wider region.

Mitigation

• Vary venues and timings; assess the small number of routinely used hotels and offices for stand-off and access control.
• Heat management as a security control: work-rest cycles, hydration, scheduling around the hottest hours, and heat-illness recognition training.
• A written incident and evacuation procedure even in a stable base, with contact tree and rehearsed first hour.
• Maritime and port operations planned against current maritime security advisories, with contingency routing for the corridor.
• Journey management on the Ethiopia corridor, treating it as a regional route rather than a domestic one.

Assessed risks

• Attack on a hotel, restaurant or venue frequented by internationals L2 × I5
• Heat-related illness or death among drivers, guards or field staff L4 × I3
• Corridor or port disruption interrupting regional supply L3 × I3
• Opportunistic crime against staff in Djibouti City L3 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Egypt's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Cairo and Alexandria, and travellers to tourist and Red Sea coastal sites.
• Humanitarian operations at the Aswan and Rafah border areas.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Vary routines and limit time at high-profile sites.
• Clear research activity with counterparts and brief staff on the law.
• Treat North Sinai as no-go without official authorisation.

Assessed risks

• Terrorist attack in a crowded or symbolic location L2 × I5
• Detention linked to journalism, research or social media L3 × I3
• Movement into restricted Sinai zones L2 × I4

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Equatorial Guinea's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Malabo and Bata.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Carry documents and brief staff.
• Follow maritime advisories.

Assessed risks

• Detention at checkpoints L3 × I3
• Maritime crime L2 × I3

Vulnerability

• Assessments and reporting written on the assumption of private communications, in a context where that assumption is unsafe.
• Staff unbriefed on what constitutes a legal risk locally, including photography, mapping and unauthorised movement.
• Programme plans that depend on permissions with no committed timeline.
• Little independent public reporting to corroborate any assessment.

Exposure

• Asmara-based staff and visitors, and permitted movement to regional towns.
• Any movement near the Ethiopian or Sudanese borders.
• Digital exposure: devices, files and communications carried into and out of the country.

Impact

• Detention, questioning or expulsion of staff, and loss of permission to operate.
• Harm to local contacts and staff whose association with the organisation is documented.
• Injury from explosive remnants in former border-conflict areas.

Mitigation

• Written legal and behavioural briefing for all staff and visitors: photography, mapping, movement permits, and what not to discuss or carry.
• Information-handling discipline: minimum data on devices, no lists of local contacts held in-country, and an assumption of non-private communications.
• Movement only with valid permits, planned around processing time rather than hoping for it.
• Explosive-ordnance awareness and adherence to marked routes near former conflict areas.
• A documented plan for what happens if a staff member is detained, including consular routes and family liaison.

Assessed risks

• Detention or questioning of staff over movement, photography or perceived political activity L3 × I4
• Harm to local staff or contacts through documented association L2 × I5
• Movement or programme blocked by withheld permissions L4 × I2
• Injury from explosive remnants of war near former border-conflict areas L2 × I5

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Eswatini's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Mbabane and Manzini.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Monitor events.
• Basic briefings.

Assessed risks

• Political unrest L2 × I3
• Crime L3 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Gabon's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Libreville and Port-Gentil.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Monitor events.
• Basic briefings.

Assessed risks

• Political disruption L2 × I3
• Crime L2 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Ghana's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Accra and Kumasi.
• Travel to the Upper East and Northern regions.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Follow local curfews and avoid the area during flare-ups.
• Vetted suppliers and personal security briefings.
• Monitor the border regions.

Assessed risks

• Communal violence in Bawku L3 × I4
• Crime and fraud L3 × I2
• Northern spillover incident L2 × I5

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Guinea-Bissau's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Bissau.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Hibernation plan.
• Basic briefings.

Assessed risks

• Political crisis or coup L3 × I3
• Petty crime L2 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Lesotho's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Maseru.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Residence security and night-movement limits.
• Monitor events.

Assessed risks

• Violent crime L3 × I3
• Political disruption L2 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Liberia's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Monrovia and county capitals.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Residence security and night-movement limits.
• Vetted drivers and vehicles.
• Monitor local media.

Assessed risks

• Crime in Monrovia L3 × I3
• Road accidents L4 × I3
• Protest disruption L2 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Malawi's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Lilongwe, Blantyre and southern districts.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Seasonal contingency plans.
• Basic briefings.
• Fuel reserves.

Assessed risks

• Flood or cyclone disruption L3 × I3
• Crime L3 × I2
• Fuel shortage disruption L3 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Morocco's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakech and Tangier.
• Travel to the Atlas and southern regions.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Low-profile conduct and vetted transport.
• Awareness of crowded locations and emergency plans.
• Earthquake preparedness and staff tracking.

Assessed risks

• Opportunistic crime against foreigners L3 × I2
• Terrorist attack on tourist sites L1 × I5
• Natural hazard disrupting operations L2 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Senegal's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Dakar.
• Travel to Casamance and the eastern border.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Monitor political events.
• Stay on main roads.
• Monitor the Mali border.

Assessed risks

• Protest disruption L2 × I3
• Landmine incident in Casamance L1 × I5
• Eastern border incident L2 × I4

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Sierra Leone's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Freetown and district towns.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Monitor events and maintain a hibernation plan.
• Personal security briefings.

Assessed risks

• Political unrest L2 × I3
• Crime L3 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Tunisia's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Tunis and coastal cities.
• Travel to the Algerian and Libyan border zones.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Limit time at symbolic sites.
• Monitor local tensions and adjust movement.
• Brief staff on decree-law restrictions.

Assessed risks

• Attack on a tourist or security target L2 × I5
• Unrest around migration in Sfax L3 × I3
• Detention for political commentary L2 × I3

Vulnerability

• Field movement in western districts planned without reference to cross-border armed activity.
• Assumption that a permissive country needs no incident procedure or movement thresholds.
• Visible association with politically sensitive activity or partners without an assessment of the consequences for staff.
• Motorcycle-taxi use and night road movement treated as normal practice.

Exposure

• Field operations and refugee-hosting districts in the west and south-west, and in Karamoja.
• Kampala offices, accommodation and movement, and inter-city road travel.
• Public gatherings, and any activity coinciding with electoral events.

Impact

• Casualties from armed attack or crossfire in western border districts.
• Injury or death from road traffic collision, including motorcycle-taxi use.
• Detention, deregistration or operational restriction following political friction.

Mitigation

• District-level movement rules for the western border and Karamoja, with approval, comms and timing standards.
• Road safety controls including a prohibition on motorcycle-taxi use for work movement and a night-travel ban.
• Election and public-order planning: monitoring, movement-pause thresholds, remote-working capability and stock buffer.
• Registration, reporting and compliance kept current, with legal advice retained before politically sensitive activity.
• Incident procedure and contact tree in place and rehearsed, in Kampala as much as in the field.

Assessed risks

• Armed attack or crossfire affecting staff in western border districts L3 × I4
• Road traffic collision, including motorcycle-taxi use L4 × I4
• Staff caught in public-order events around an election cycle L3 × I3
• Administrative or legal restriction on operations L3 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Zimbabwe's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Harare and Bulawayo.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Brief staff and keep a neutral profile.
• Basic briefings.
• Cash and fuel contingencies.

Assessed risks

• Detention linked to political activity L2 × I3
• Crime L3 × I2
• Supply shortages L3 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Botswana's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Gaborone and travellers to safari areas.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Basic briefings.
• Daylight driving and vetted vehicles.

Assessed risks

• Crime L2 × I2
• Road accidents L3 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Cabo Verde's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff and visitors in Praia, Mindelo and Sal.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Basic personal security briefings.
• Flexible travel planning.

Assessed risks

• Street crime L3 × I2
• Maritime or weather disruption L2 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Gambia's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff and visitors in Banjul and the coastal strip.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Basic personal security briefings.
• Monitor local news.

Assessed risks

• Petty crime L3 × I2
• Political protest L2 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Mauritius's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff and visitors in Port Louis and coastal areas.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Basic briefings.
• Seasonal plans.

Assessed risks

• Petty crime L2 × I2
• Cyclone L2 × I2

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Namibia's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Windhoek and travellers in remote areas.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Basic briefings.
• Daylight driving.

Assessed risks

• Crime L2 × I2
• Road accidents L3 × I3

Vulnerability

• Research, interviews and reporting conducted without an assessment of the legal and personal exposure for participants and national staff.
• Assumption that low crime means no incident planning, leaving no procedure for a cross-border escalation.
• Movement to the north-west planned without reference to border status.
• Data on devices and in reports that could identify individuals.

Exposure

• Kigali offices, accommodation and visitor movement.
• North-western districts near the DRC border, including movement to Gisenyi and Rubavu.
• Interviews, assessments and data collection involving individuals who may be identifiable.

Impact

• Harm to participants, contacts or national staff arising from identifiable data or reporting.
• Injury or death from road traffic collision.
• Sudden loss of access or movement disruption in the north-west during cross-border escalation.

Mitigation

• Information and data-protection discipline: minimum data collected, anonymisation by default, informed consent, no identifiable contact lists on devices.
• Legal review before publishing or conducting politically sensitive research, and a briefing on local law for all staff and visitors.
• Road safety controls: driver standards, night-travel restriction, wet-weather rules on hill roads, vehicle checks.
• North-west movement rules linked to border status, with contingency plans and suspension thresholds.
• Incident procedure and contact tree in place, however low the incident rate.

Assessed risks

• Harm to participants, contacts or staff through identifiable data or reporting L2 × I5
• Road traffic collision on hill roads or in wet conditions L3 × I4
• Cross-border escalation disrupting north-western operations L3 × I3
• Legal or administrative exposure from research or public comment L2 × I4

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Sao Tome and Principe's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff and visitors in São Tomé.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Basic briefings.
• Maritime advisories.

Assessed risks

• Petty crime L2 × I2
• Maritime incident L2 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Seychelles's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff and visitors on Mahé and Praslin; maritime operations.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Basic briefings.
• Follow UKMTO and EU NAVFOR guidance.

Assessed risks

• Petty crime L2 × I2
• Piracy at sea L2 × I4

Vulnerability

• Low perceived threat leading to no security plan, no incident procedure and no briefing.
• Night road movement and long inter-city driving accepted as normal.
• Ferry and boat movement without a check on operator standards or lifejacket availability.
• Compliance treated as an administrative task rather than an operational risk.

Exposure

• Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Zanzibar offices, accommodation and visitor movement.
• Inter-city road movement and field operations, including south-eastern regions.
• Ferry and boat movement, including Zanzibar and lake routes.

Impact

• Injury or death from road traffic collision or a marine incident.
• Loss of assets and staff welfare consequences from violent crime.
• Suspension of operations or loss of registration following a compliance failure.

Mitigation

• Road safety programme: driver standards, journey approval for long routes, speed policy, night-travel ban, vehicle checks.
• Marine movement standards: operator selection, lifejackets, manifest, and a rule against overloaded vessels.
• Crime controls proportionate to the threat: area briefing, transport arrangements, cash-handling rules, residence standards.
• Compliance calendar with named owners for registration, permits, tax and reporting deadlines.
• Separate movement standard for Mtwara and Ruvuma border districts, with monitoring of cross-border incident reporting.

Assessed risks

• Road traffic collision on an inter-city route L4 × I4
• Violent or opportunistic crime against staff or visitors L3 × I3
• Marine incident on a ferry or boat movement L2 × I5
• Security incident in south-eastern border districts L2 × I4
• Regulatory or registration failure interrupting operations L3 × I3

Vulnerability

• Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Zambia's main urban centres.
• Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
• Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
• Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Exposure

• Staff in Lusaka and the Copperbelt.

Impact

• Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
• Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
• Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Mitigation

• Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
• Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
• Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
• Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
• Basic briefings.
• Backup power.

Assessed risks

• Crime L2 × I2
• Power-cut disruption L4 × I2