Western Sahara: Geopolitical Risk Assessment
A disputed territory under Moroccan administration where the 1991 ceasefire broke down in 2020; low-level exchanges continue along the berm.
Analyst assessment from public sources, written for practitioners. Threat levels describe the general environment for a civilian organisation; they are not a substitute for an organisation's own assessment of its own exposure.
Operating environment
- Travel to Laayoune and Dakhla, largely permissive.
- Any movement near the berm or into the buffer strip.
Threats
- Sporadic exchanges of fire and drone strikes near the berm between Moroccan forces and the Polisario Front.
- Landmines and unexploded ordnance near the berm.
- Restrictions on journalists, researchers and activists.
Vulnerabilities
- Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Western Sahara's main urban centres.
- Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
- Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
- Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.
Operational considerations
- Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
- Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
- Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
- Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
- Stay on known roads; avoid the berm.
- Brief staff on sensitivities.
- Treat the berm area as no-go.
Country context
Structured operating picture
Security environment
- Sporadic exchanges of fire and drone strikes near the berm between Moroccan forces and the Polisario Front.
- Landmines and unexploded ordnance near the berm.
- Restrictions on journalists, researchers and activists.
Political environment
- Travel to Laayoune and Dakhla, largely permissive.
- Any movement near the berm or into the buffer strip.
Armed actors
- Sporadic exchanges of fire and drone strikes near the berm between Moroccan forces and the Polisario Front.
- Landmines and unexploded ordnance near the berm.
- Restrictions on journalists, researchers and activists.
Conflict dynamics
- Travel to Laayoune and Dakhla, largely permissive.
- Any movement near the berm or into the buffer strip.
Humanitarian conditions
- Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
- Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
- Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.
Crime and personal security
- Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Western Sahara's main urban centres.
- Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
- Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
Maritime exposure
- No direct maritime exposure; second-order supply and corridor effects remain relevant.
Infrastructure and access
- Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
- Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
- Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
Regional exposure
- Travel to Laayoune and Dakhla, largely permissive.
- Any movement near the berm or into the buffer strip.
Key drivers
See operating environment above.
Indicators
Review changes in threat, exposure and access.
Limitations
Open-source coverage varies and cannot establish every local condition.
If it happens
- Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
- Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
- Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.
Rated risks
| Ref | Risk | L | I | Rating | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EH-01 | Landmine or ordnance incident | 2 | 5 | SUBSTANTIAL | Stay on known roads; avoid the berm. |
| EH-02 | Expulsion or detention linked to political activity | 3 | 3 | MODERATE | Brief staff on sensitivities. |
| EH-03 | Exposure to cross-berm fire | 2 | 5 | SUBSTANTIAL | Treat the berm area as no-go. |
Residual risk
SUBSTANTIAL near the berm; lower in the main towns.
Reliability & Confidence
Reliability: Usually reliable public sources; individual incident reports may be single-source. · Confidence: Moderate, consistent open-source reporting, limited independent verification outside main cities.
Sources
- · ACLED conflict event data
- · UN OCHA situation reports and ReliefWeb country pages
- · UN Security Council and panel-of-experts reporting
- · UK FCDO and US State Department travel advice
- · National and regional media monitoring