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Country Risk Laboratory
SUBSTANTIALAn attack is likely.Reviewed October 2026

Western Sahara: Geopolitical Risk Assessment

A disputed territory under Moroccan administration where the 1991 ceasefire broke down in 2020; low-level exchanges continue along the berm.

Analyst assessment from public sources, written for practitioners. Threat levels describe the general environment for a civilian organisation; they are not a substitute for an organisation's own assessment of its own exposure.

Operating environment

  • Travel to Laayoune and Dakhla, largely permissive.
  • Any movement near the berm or into the buffer strip.

Threats

  • Sporadic exchanges of fire and drone strikes near the berm between Moroccan forces and the Polisario Front.
  • Landmines and unexploded ordnance near the berm.
  • Restrictions on journalists, researchers and activists.

Vulnerabilities

  • Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Western Sahara's main urban centres.
  • Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
  • Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
  • Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Operational considerations

  • Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
  • Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
  • Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
  • Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
  • Stay on known roads; avoid the berm.
  • Brief staff on sensitivities.
  • Treat the berm area as no-go.

Country context

Structured operating picture

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Security environment

  • Sporadic exchanges of fire and drone strikes near the berm between Moroccan forces and the Polisario Front.
  • Landmines and unexploded ordnance near the berm.
  • Restrictions on journalists, researchers and activists.

Political environment

  • Travel to Laayoune and Dakhla, largely permissive.
  • Any movement near the berm or into the buffer strip.

Armed actors

  • Sporadic exchanges of fire and drone strikes near the berm between Moroccan forces and the Polisario Front.
  • Landmines and unexploded ordnance near the berm.
  • Restrictions on journalists, researchers and activists.

Conflict dynamics

  • Travel to Laayoune and Dakhla, largely permissive.
  • Any movement near the berm or into the buffer strip.

Humanitarian conditions

  • Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
  • Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
  • Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Crime and personal security

  • Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Western Sahara's main urban centres.
  • Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
  • Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.

Maritime exposure

  • No direct maritime exposure; second-order supply and corridor effects remain relevant.

Infrastructure and access

  • Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
  • Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
  • Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.

Regional exposure

  • Travel to Laayoune and Dakhla, largely permissive.
  • Any movement near the berm or into the buffer strip.

Key drivers

See operating environment above.

Indicators

Review changes in threat, exposure and access.

Limitations

Open-source coverage varies and cannot establish every local condition.

If it happens

  • Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
  • Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
  • Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Rated risks

RefRiskLIRatingMitigation
EH-01Landmine or ordnance incident25SUBSTANTIALStay on known roads; avoid the berm.
EH-02Expulsion or detention linked to political activity33MODERATEBrief staff on sensitivities.
EH-03Exposure to cross-berm fire25SUBSTANTIALTreat the berm area as no-go.

Residual risk

SUBSTANTIAL near the berm; lower in the main towns.

Source reliability

Reliability: Usually reliable public sources; individual incident reports may be single-source.

Sources

  • · ACLED conflict event data
  • · UN OCHA situation reports and ReliefWeb country pages
  • · UN Security Council and panel-of-experts reporting
  • · UK FCDO and US State Department travel advice
  • · National and regional media monitoring

Mazin Intel

Independent African security & maritime intelligence

Original analysis is distinguished from source reporting. Publication alone does not establish analyst review. Founder review is shown only where it has been recorded.

For shipowners, insurers and risk teams

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