MODERATEAn attack is possible, but not likely.Reviewed September 2026

Uganda: Geopolitical Risk Assessment

Generally permissive for civilian operations, with concentrated risk in the western border districts near the DRC, political and public-order friction around elections, and criminality in Kampala.

Analyst assessment from public sources, written for practitioners. Threat levels describe the general environment for a civilian organisation; they are not a substitute for an organisation's own assessment of its own exposure.

Operating environment

Field operations and refugee-hosting districts in the west and south-west, and in Karamoja.
Kampala offices, accommodation and movement, and inter-city road travel.
Public gatherings, and any activity coinciding with electoral events.

Threats

ADF-linked attacks and cross-border armed activity affecting western districts near the DRC border, including attacks on villages and roads.
Occasional attacks and attempted attacks in urban centres, with intent against soft targets.
Politically driven public-order events, particularly around election cycles, with the risk of force used against crowds and of restrictions on movement and communications.
Cattle-raiding and armed criminality in parts of Karamoja.
Urban crime in Kampala, including robbery targeting foreigners, and significant road traffic risk on inter-city routes.

Vulnerabilities

Field movement in western districts planned without reference to cross-border armed activity.
Assumption that a permissive country needs no incident procedure or movement thresholds.
Visible association with politically sensitive activity or partners without an assessment of the consequences for staff.
Motorcycle-taxi use and night road movement treated as normal practice.

Operational considerations

District-level movement rules for the western border and Karamoja, with approval, comms and timing standards.
Road safety controls including a prohibition on motorcycle-taxi use for work movement and a night-travel ban.
Election and public-order planning: monitoring, movement-pause thresholds, remote-working capability and stock buffer.
Registration, reporting and compliance kept current, with legal advice retained before politically sensitive activity.
Incident procedure and contact tree in place and rehearsed, in Kampala as much as in the field.

Country context

Structured operating picture

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Security environment

ADF-linked attacks and cross-border armed activity affecting western districts near the DRC border, including attacks on villages and roads.
Occasional attacks and attempted attacks in urban centres, with intent against soft targets.
Politically driven public-order events, particularly around election cycles, with the risk of force used against crowds and of restrictions on movement and communications.

Political environment

ADF activity and regional operations: Attacks attributed to the ADF, including on soft targets, and joint operations across the Congolese border keep an interstate and insurgent dimension in play.
Election-period political control: Registration, campaigning and result periods bring arrests, restrictions and localised disorder that affect movement in Kampala.
Refugee-hosting responsibilities: One of the largest refugee populations in the region concentrates humanitarian activity in the west and north, near volatile borders.

Armed actors

Allied Democratic Forces: Armed group operating across the Congolese border, associated with attacks on civilians and devices.
UPDF and Ugandan police: State forces with regional deployments and firm control of public assembly.
Opposition political movements: Organised political actors whose activity draws a hard policing response.

Conflict dynamics

Field operations and refugee-hosting districts in the west and south-west, and in Karamoja.
Kampala offices, accommodation and movement, and inter-city road travel.
Public gatherings, and any activity coinciding with electoral events.

Humanitarian conditions

Casualties from armed attack or crossfire in western border districts.
Injury or death from road traffic collision, including motorcycle-taxi use.
Detention, deregistration or operational restriction following political friction.

Crime and personal security

Field movement in western districts planned without reference to cross-border armed activity.
Assumption that a permissive country needs no incident procedure or movement thresholds.
Visible association with politically sensitive activity or partners without an assessment of the consequences for staff.

Maritime exposure

No direct maritime exposure; second-order supply and corridor effects remain relevant.

Infrastructure and access

District-level movement rules for the western border and Karamoja, with approval, comms and timing standards.
Road safety controls including a prohibition on motorcycle-taxi use for work movement and a night-travel ban.
Election and public-order planning: monitoring, movement-pause thresholds, remote-working capability and stock buffer.

Regional exposure

Attacks or device recoveries in Kampala or in the western border districts.
Political detentions, restrictions on assembly and internet controls around electoral milestones.
Cross-border operations reporting in North Kivu and Ituri.

Key drivers

ADF activity and regional operations · Election-period political control · Refugee-hosting responsibilities · Extractive and infrastructure development

Indicators

Attacks or device recoveries in Kampala or in the western border districts. · Political detentions, restrictions on assembly and internet controls around electoral milestones. · Cross-border operations reporting in North Kivu and Ituri.

Limitations

ADF attribution is applied broadly and not always evidenced. Incidents in remote western districts surface slowly and casualty details are revised.

If it happens

Casualties from armed attack or crossfire in western border districts.
Injury or death from road traffic collision, including motorcycle-taxi use.
Detention, deregistration or operational restriction following political friction.

Rated risks

Ref	Risk	L	I	Rating	Mitigation
UG-A1	Armed attack or crossfire affecting staff in western border districts	3	4	SUBSTANTIAL	District movement rules; local early-warning indicators; daylight movement; suspension thresholds.
UG-A2	Road traffic collision, including motorcycle-taxi use	4	4	SEVERE	Driver standards; motorcycle-taxi prohibition for work travel; speed policy; night-travel ban; vehicle checks.
UG-A3	Staff caught in public-order events around an election cycle	3	3	MODERATE	Monitoring and notification; movement-pause thresholds; remote-working plan; avoid assembly points.
UG-A4	Administrative or legal restriction on operations	3	3	MODERATE	Keep registration and reporting current; retain legal advice; assess political exposure of activities and partners.

Residual risk

Low to medium nationally, medium to high in western border districts. Road traffic remains the dominant expected loss.

Reliability & Confidence

Reliability: B · Confidence: Moderate to high. Reporting is reasonably open and consistent, with less detail on cross-border incidents.

Sources

· ACLED conflict event data
· UN OCHA situation reports and ReliefWeb country pages
· Insecurity Insight aid-security incident data
· UK FCDO and US State Department travel advice
· National and regional media monitoring
· Ugandan national media monitoring
· UNHCR refugee-response reporting