SEVEREAn attack is highly likely.Reviewed October 2026

Chad: Geopolitical Risk Assessment

Transitional politics after 2021, Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad basin and the arrival of refugees from Sudan's war drive a complex picture.

Analyst assessment from public sources, written for practitioners. Threat levels describe the general environment for a civilian organisation; they are not a substitute for an organisation's own assessment of its own exposure.

Operating environment

Staff in N'Djamena and humanitarian hubs in the east (Abéché, Adré).
Road movement in the east and Lake region.

Threats

Boko Haram and ISWAP attacks in the Lake Chad area.
Rebel groups operating from the north and from Libya.
Spillover from Sudan's war in the east, including armed movement and refugee pressure.
Political tension and protest in N'Djamena.

Vulnerabilities

Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Chad's main urban centres.
Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.
Local partners and drivers engaged without a shared security standard or a briefing on current threat indicators.

Operational considerations

Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.
Pre-deployment briefings that cover the current threat picture, local law and cultural sensitivities.
Escorted or no movement in the Lake region.
Daylight movement in convoy with check-ins.
Hibernation plan and stocks.

Country context

Structured operating picture

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Security environment

Boko Haram and ISWAP attacks in the Lake Chad area.
Rebel groups operating from the north and from Libya.
Spillover from Sudan's war in the east, including armed movement and refugee pressure.

Political environment

Staff in N'Djamena and humanitarian hubs in the east (Abéché, Adré).
Road movement in the east and Lake region.

Armed actors

Boko Haram and ISWAP attacks in the Lake Chad area.
Rebel groups operating from the north and from Libya.
Spillover from Sudan's war in the east, including armed movement and refugee pressure.

Conflict dynamics

Staff in N'Djamena and humanitarian hubs in the east (Abéché, Adré).
Road movement in the east and Lake region.

Humanitarian conditions

Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Crime and personal security

Movement planned on habit rather than a current route assessment, with no written abort criteria for travel outside Chad's main urban centres.
Premises, accommodation and meeting venues chosen for convenience, with limited stand-off, access control or a second exit.
Single communications channel and check-in intervals long enough that a missing team would go unnoticed for hours.

Maritime exposure

No direct maritime exposure; second-order supply and corridor effects remain relevant.

Infrastructure and access

Route and movement approval tied to a current written assessment, with defined no-go areas and abort criteria.
Hibernation, relocation and evacuation plans tested at least once a year, with trigger points agreed in advance.
Redundant communications (mobile, satellite, radio where licensed) and short, monitored check-in schedules.

Regional exposure

Staff in N'Djamena and humanitarian hubs in the east (Abéché, Adré).
Road movement in the east and Lake region.

Key drivers

See operating environment above.

Indicators

Review changes in threat, exposure and access.

Limitations

Open-source coverage varies and cannot establish every local condition.

If it happens

Injury, detention or loss of life to staff, with lasting duty-of-care, family-liaison and legal obligations.
Suspension of programmes or operations and loss of access that can take months to rebuild.
Reputational and relationship damage with authorities, communities and partners if an incident is handled poorly.

Rated risks

Ref	Risk	L	I	Rating	Mitigation
TD-01	Attack in the Lake Chad region	4	5	CRITICAL	Escorted or no movement in the Lake region.
TD-02	Armed banditry on eastern roads	4	4	SEVERE	Daylight movement in convoy with check-ins.
TD-03	Unrest in N'Djamena	3	3	MODERATE	Hibernation plan and stocks.

Residual risk

SEVERE outside the capital; SUBSTANTIAL in N'Djamena.

Reliability & Confidence

Reliability: Usually reliable public sources; individual incident reports may be single-source. · Confidence: Moderate, consistent open-source reporting, limited independent verification outside main cities.

Sources

· ACLED conflict event data
· UN OCHA situation reports and ReliefWeb country pages
· UN Security Council and panel-of-experts reporting
· UK FCDO and US State Department travel advice
· National and regional media monitoring