SUBSTANTIALAn attack is likely.Reviewed September 2026

Ethiopia: Geopolitical Risk Assessment

A country where the security picture is regional rather than national: Addis Ababa functions normally while armed conflict, communication restrictions and access denial persist in parts of Amhara, Oromia and the Tigray periphery.

Analyst assessment from public sources, written for practitioners. Threat levels describe the general environment for a civilian organisation; they are not a substitute for an organisation's own assessment of its own exposure.

Operating environment

Field offices and monitoring visits in Amhara, Oromia, Afar and the Tigray periphery.
Long-distance road movement, including night arrival at regional towns where curfews change with little notice.
Addis-based staff and visitors, whose day-to-day exposure is far lower but who may travel at short notice.

Threats

Armed confrontation between federal forces and organised armed groups in parts of Amhara and Oromia, including attacks on road users and abduction for ransom.
Unresolved tension in and around Tigray and disputed boundary areas, with the risk of renewed escalation.
Inter-communal violence and displacement in Oromia–Somali and Afar periphery areas.
Administrative threats to operations: movement permissions withheld, communication shutdowns, and pressure on staff of particular ethnic backgrounds.

Vulnerabilities

Programmes designed around road movement between regional capitals, where control is not continuous.
Reliance on mobile networks and internet for check-ins, in a context where shutdowns are used as a control measure.
National staff exposed to identity-based pressure at checkpoints, with no written protocol for what they may and may not carry.
Access negotiated informally with local authorities rather than through a documented, escalatable arrangement.

Operational considerations

Region-specific movement rules rather than a single country policy: separate approval levels for Amhara, Oromia, Afar and Tigray-periphery travel.
No night road movement; arrival deadlines set with daylight margin; overnight stops planned, not improvised.
Communications redundancy, satellite messenger or radio where networks are unreliable, with a documented no-contact procedure.
Written protocol for national staff at checkpoints, agreed with them, covering documentation, questioning and what to do if separated.
Access agreements documented at the level that can enforce them, with an escalation route when local permission is withdrawn.

Country context

Structured operating picture

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Security environment

Armed confrontation between federal forces and organised armed groups in parts of Amhara and Oromia, including attacks on road users and abduction for ransom.
Unresolved tension in and around Tigray and disputed boundary areas, with the risk of renewed escalation.
Inter-communal violence and displacement in Oromia–Somali and Afar periphery areas.

Political environment

Post-war settlement in Tigray: Implementation of the cessation of hostilities remains incomplete on disputed territory, disarmament and returns, and internal political competition within Tigray's administration is itself a source of instability.
Amhara insurgency: Fighting between federal forces and Fano formations produces road closures, communication blackouts and abductions on main routes, with little warning and irregular reporting.
Oromia conflict: A long-running insurgency with a pattern of abduction for ransom, roadblocks and attacks on local officials that affects rural movement and staff recruitment.

Armed actors

Federal government and ENDF: State authority conducting simultaneous operations in more than one region.
Fano formations: Decentralised Amhara armed groups without a single command, which makes negotiated movement unreliable.
Oromo Liberation Army: Insurgent group associated with abduction, roadblocks and rural attacks.

Conflict dynamics

Field offices and monitoring visits in Amhara, Oromia, Afar and the Tigray periphery.
Long-distance road movement, including night arrival at regional towns where curfews change with little notice.
Addis-based staff and visitors, whose day-to-day exposure is far lower but who may travel at short notice.

Humanitarian conditions

Staff injury or death from crossfire, roadside devices and armed robbery on regional roads.
Abduction of staff for ransom, with a real prospect of long negotiation.
Loss of programme continuity where access is withheld, and loss of situational awareness during communications shutdowns.

Crime and personal security

Programmes designed around road movement between regional capitals, where control is not continuous.
Reliance on mobile networks and internet for check-ins, in a context where shutdowns are used as a control measure.
National staff exposed to identity-based pressure at checkpoints, with no written protocol for what they may and may not carry.

Maritime exposure

No direct maritime exposure; second-order supply and corridor effects remain relevant.

Infrastructure and access

Region-specific movement rules rather than a single country policy: separate approval levels for Amhara, Oromia, Afar and Tigray-periphery travel.
No night road movement; arrival deadlines set with daylight margin; overnight stops planned, not improvised.
Communications redundancy, satellite messenger or radio where networks are unreliable, with a documented no-contact procedure.

Regional exposure

Regional states of emergency, curfews and internet or telephone shutdowns.
Ambush and abduction reporting on the Addis Ababa–Bahir Dar, Addis–Dessie and Addis–Nekemte corridors.
Federal statements on operations in Amhara or Oromia, and mobilisation of regional forces.

Key drivers

Post-war settlement in Tigray · Amhara insurgency · Oromia conflict · Economic pressure and service strain

Indicators

Regional states of emergency, curfews and internet or telephone shutdowns. · Ambush and abduction reporting on the Addis Ababa–Bahir Dar, Addis–Dessie and Addis–Nekemte corridors. · Federal statements on operations in Amhara or Oromia, and mobilisation of regional forces.

Limitations

Communication shutdowns and restricted access mean incidents in Amhara and parts of Oromia surface days late and incomplete. Casualty and attribution claims from all sides should be treated as reported, not confirmed.

If it happens

Staff injury or death from crossfire, roadside devices and armed robbery on regional roads.
Abduction of staff for ransom, with a real prospect of long negotiation.
Loss of programme continuity where access is withheld, and loss of situational awareness during communications shutdowns.

Rated risks

Ref	Risk	L	I	Rating	Mitigation
ET-A1	Staff caught in armed confrontation or crossfire during regional road movement	3	5	SEVERE	Region-specific movement approval; daylight-only travel; route assessment refreshed on the day; abort criteria.
ET-A2	Abduction for ransom on an Amhara or Oromia road corridor	3	5	SEVERE	Reduce predictability; low-profile vehicles and posture; restrict movement disclosure; rehearsed crisis plan.
ET-A3	Loss of contact with a field team during a communications shutdown	4	3	SUBSTANTIAL	Redundant comms; pre-agreed check-in windows; no-contact procedure with escalation timings.
ET-A4	Access withdrawn or permissions withheld, suspending delivery	4	3	SUBSTANTIAL	Documented access agreements; partner-led contingency delivery; pre-agreed suspension and resumption criteria.
ET-A5	Identity-based pressure or detention of national staff at a checkpoint	3	4	SUBSTANTIAL	Agreed checkpoint protocol; documentation discipline; named legal and welfare support; incident reporting without blame.

Residual risk

Medium to high in the affected regions, low to medium in Addis Ababa. Treat the country as several environments with separate residual risk statements rather than one.

Reliability & Confidence

Reliability: B · Confidence: Moderate. Public event reporting is uneven across regions, and communications restrictions delay and thin the reporting that does emerge.

Sources

· ACLED conflict event data
· UN OCHA situation reports and ReliefWeb country pages
· Insecurity Insight aid-security incident data
· UK FCDO and US State Department travel advice
· National and regional media monitoring
· Ethiopian Human Rights Commission public statements
· Ethiopian and diaspora media monitoring