Single Risk Briefing
£495–£950
Single-issue risk analysis or country threat assessment for a specific transit lane, port entry, or market deployment.

Independent. Africa-wide. Evidence-led.
Public-source monitoring across all 54 African countries, with deeper research coverage of the Horn of Africa and Red Sea. Country assessments and record availability vary; monitoring does not imply a completed assessment.
Africa Operations Map
12 sourced records · How we process these · select a country to inspect
Some operations data is unavailable. Displayed records retain their original sources.
Priority country watchlist
Critical countries and standing priorities, assessed from named public sources.
Services
Every Mazin Intel service, grouped by discipline, with indicative fees.
A · Geopolitical & Country Risk Intelligence
B · Maritime Intelligence
C · Corporate Security & Threat Intelligence
D · OSINT & Due Diligence
E · Market Entry & Strategic Risk Advisory
Ways to engage
£495–£950
Single-issue risk analysis or country threat assessment for a specific transit lane, port entry, or market deployment.
From £6,000/year
Dashboard access, dated public-source intelligence, operations maps and published early-warning indicators for operational teams. Historical registers and vessel data are labelled separately.
Bespoke quotation
Bespoke market entry strategy, deep-dive corporate due diligence, and dedicated analyst project mapping.
Contact Lead AnalystIndicative fees; final fees depend on scope and are confirmed in a written proposal.
Africa Intelligence Centre
Recent public-source records showing date, location, category, source, evidence status, assessment and known limitations.
Africa Security Watchlist
These research topics and proposed trajectories were reviewed by the founder on 23 October 2026. They are not current country ratings or verified alerts. Countries without a proposed trajectory are marked "Baseline Monitoring": collection continues, but no rating or trajectory has been assessed.
58 locations
| Location | Proposed trajectory | Research topics | Review |
|---|---|---|---|
| Somalia | Deteriorating | Attack method, force posture and corridor access | Reviewed |
| Ethiopia | Unresolved | Regional armed activity, access restrictions and communications | Reviewed |
| Eritrea | Under review | Border posture, mobilisation signals and third-country reporting | Reviewed |
| Sudan | Deteriorating | Front-line movement, civilian access and infrastructure continuity | Reviewed |
| South Sudan | Developing | Political implementation, subnational violence and corridor access | Reviewed |
| Kenya | Unresolved | Civil unrest, north-eastern spillover and corridor disruption | Reviewed |
| Djibouti | Stable | Port continuity, regional basing and border conditions | Reviewed |
| Red Sea | Developing | Maritime incident reports, naval posture and shipping decisions | Reviewed |
| Gulf of Aden | Developing | Approach reports, piracy indicators and route choices | Reviewed |
| East Africa & Horn | Under review | Cross-border displacement, political friction and access constraints | Reviewed |
| Algeria | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Angola | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Benin | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Botswana | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Burkina Faso | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Burundi | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Cabo Verde | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Cameroon | Deteriorating | Armed groups, kidnapping and political violence (10 reports) | Reviewed |
| Central African Republic | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Chad | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Comoros | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Congo | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Côte d'Ivoire | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| DR Congo | Developing | Displacement, humanitarian security and early-warning reporting (11 reports) | Reviewed |
| Egypt | Developing | Political violence, maritime and humanitarian security (11 reports) | Reviewed |
| Equatorial Guinea | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Eswatini | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Gabon | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Gambia | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Ghana | Developing | Organised crime, border security and civil unrest; reporting rising (71 reports) | Reviewed |
| Guinea | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Guinea-Bissau | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Lesotho | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Liberia | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Libya | Under review | Political violence and armed groups; reporting has fallen (18 reports) | Reviewed |
| Madagascar | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Malawi | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Mali | Unresolved | Political violence, kidnapping and regional security (8 reports) | Reviewed |
| Mauritania | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Mauritius | Developing | Organised crime, maritime and civil unrest reporting (12 reports) | Reviewed |
| Morocco | Developing | Critical infrastructure, cyber and civil unrest reporting (8 reports) | Reviewed |
| Mozambique | Developing | Armed groups, humanitarian access and civil unrest (12 reports) | Reviewed |
| Namibia | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Niger | Under review | Armed groups, kidnapping and military activity. Reporting-volume observations dated 22 October 2026 are not a current threat judgement. | Reviewed |
| Nigeria | Deteriorating | Kidnapping, armed groups and civil unrest (447 sourced reports, 90 days) | Reviewed |
| Rwanda | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Sao Tome and Principe | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Senegal | Deteriorating | Civil unrest and kidnapping reporting (8 reports) | Reviewed |
| Seychelles | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Sierra Leone | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| South Africa | Developing | Crime, kidnapping and civil unrest; reporting rising (53 reports) | Reviewed |
| Tanzania | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Togo | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Tunisia | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Uganda | Developing | Civil unrest, corridor security and armed groups; reporting rising (28 reports) | Reviewed |
| Western Sahara | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Zambia | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
| Zimbabwe | Baseline Monitoring | Continuous public-source monitoring. | Reviewed |
Linked workspaces contain public-source records. Review of these research topics and proposed trajectories does not establish a current country rating, verify every linked record or imply a low-risk condition.
What you receive
| Mazin Intel | Common practice | |
|---|---|---|
| Sources | Every finding names its public source and links to it | Sources often summarised or withheld |
| Uncertainty | Gaps and limits of the evidence stated plainly in each assessment | Certainty often implied |
| Coverage | All 54 African countries plus Red Sea and Gulf of Aden corridors | Often limited to a few priority markets |
| Evidence status | Confirmed, Reported, Assessed and Scenario kept separate | Facts and opinion frequently mixed |
| Independence | No ties to insurers, brokers or governments | Varies by provider |
| Gaps | Unrated areas stay unrated rather than guessed | Gaps rarely disclosed |
"Common practice" describes general patterns in the risk market, not any named provider.
The Mazin Intel Method
Independent commercial intelligence across all 54 African countries and adjacent maritime corridors, built on dated reporting, named sources and explicit evidence limits. Assessments distinguish between reported information, verified information and analytical judgement. Evidence limitations are recorded, and certainty is never implied where evidence is limited.
Read the methodologySupported by authoritative or multiple independent sources.
Credible reporting exists but independent confirmation is limited.
An analytical judgement based on available evidence.
A plausible future development rather than a confirmed event.
Sample deliverable · free to download
Download a sample port exposure assessment for the Port of Aden, Yemen, and its Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb approaches. It is built only from sourced records Mazin Intel already holds, with recorded incident dates, named sources and unrated segments where no judgement exists.
Free to download
Free to download. Yemen is included as an approved exception because the port sits on the Gulf of Aden corridor serving African trade.
Read the Red Sea sample onlineOur standards are written down rather than asserted: methodology, sourcing and analyst accountability are all open to inspection before you commission work.
Collection layers, source reliability ratings and confidence scoring are documented on the Methodology page.
Each item carries publisher, original link, collection layer and a data-as-of timestamp.
Assessment inputs are scored in your browser; readiness reports are generated locally.
Assessments are attributable to a named analyst, with judgement separated from reporting.
Records outside African countries and their adjacent maritime corridors are filtered out of the intelligence pipeline.
Any record can be contested; corrections and retractions are logged against the original entry.
Corporate due diligence — company registration, professional memberships, information security posture, insurance cover — is provided directly to prospective clients and procurement teams on request as part of the contracting pack.
Mazin Intel
Independent African security & maritime intelligence
Original analysis is distinguished from source reporting. Publication alone does not establish analyst review. Founder review is shown only where it has been recorded.
For shipowners, insurers and risk teams
Country, port and voyage briefings with named sources, stated confidence and clear evidence limits.