CRITICALAn attack is highly likely in the near future.Reviewed September 2026

Sudan: Geopolitical Risk Assessment

Active war between organised military forces, with urban ground fighting, air and artillery use, collapsed services, and humanitarian access determined by front lines and by permissions from the parties.

Analyst assessment from public sources, written for practitioners. Threat levels describe the general environment for a civilian organisation; they are not a substitute for an organisation's own assessment of its own exposure.

Operating environment

Khartoum State, Darfur states and Kordofan, where ground fighting and air attack have been concentrated.
Port Sudan and eastern Sudan as the main entry, logistics and relocation route.
Cross-line and cross-border convoy movement, including from Chad and South Sudan.

Threats

Sustained hostilities between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, including indirect fire and air attack affecting residential districts.
Armed looting of humanitarian premises, vehicles, warehouses and convoys, reported repeatedly by agencies.
Detention, harassment and interrogation of aid staff at checkpoints, and pressure on national staff over perceived affiliation.
Explosive remnants of war in areas where fighting has passed, including unexploded ordnance in urban plots and along roads.
Communications and banking collapse in parts of the country, which is a threat to duty of care as much as an inconvenience.

Vulnerabilities

Any fixed, identifiable premises holding fuel, vehicles or commodities is a looting target regardless of flag or signage.
Front lines move; movement plans built on last week's control map are wrong.
Cross-line movement requires permission from more than one party, and each permission can be withdrawn.
National staff and their families remain in place when international staff relocate, carrying the residual exposure.

Operational considerations

Programme criticality review: agree in writing which activities justify presence, and stop the rest.
Minimum footprint, no fuel or vehicle stockpiles at staffed premises; disperse stock; keep cash holdings low and documented.
Cross-line movement only with permissions from every relevant party, confirmed the same day, with a no-go default.
National staff support built in from the start: relocation options, salary continuity, family contact arrangements, and a decision about what is owed if international staff withdraw.
Explosive-ordnance awareness briefing for all staff, route clearance information from mine-action actors, and a rule against entering unswept damaged buildings.
Relocation and hibernation plans written, resourced and rehearsed, with trigger indicators agreed before they are needed.

Country context

Structured operating picture

Open country dashboard →

Security environment

Sustained hostilities between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, including indirect fire and air attack affecting residential districts.
Armed looting of humanitarian premises, vehicles, warehouses and convoys, reported repeatedly by agencies.
Detention, harassment and interrogation of aid staff at checkpoints, and pressure on national staff over perceived affiliation.

Political environment

War between SAF and RSF: Two forces with heavy weapons contesting cities, with front lines that move and no reliable deconfliction for civilian movement.
Ethnic targeting in Darfur: Reported mass atrocity against specific communities, which changes the character of risk for local staff by identity rather than by role.
Collapse of civil systems: Banking, fuel, telecommunications and health services function intermittently, so ordinary logistics become the operational risk.

Armed actors

Sudanese Armed Forces: State military with air power, controlling shifting territory and formal authorisation channels.
Rapid Support Forces: Paramilitary force holding large areas, associated with looting, occupation of premises and ethnic targeting.
Aligned militias and armed movements: Local formations aligned to either side, or holding ground independently, with their own conduct.

Conflict dynamics

Khartoum State, Darfur states and Kordofan, where ground fighting and air attack have been concentrated.
Port Sudan and eastern Sudan as the main entry, logistics and relocation route.
Cross-line and cross-border convoy movement, including from Chad and South Sudan.

Humanitarian conditions

Death and serious injury of staff, including from indirect fire with no attack directed at the organisation at all.
Total loss of assets, stock and premises through looting, and loss of the capacity to deliver at all in an area.
Prolonged detention of staff, and severe welfare consequences for national staff and their dependants.

Crime and personal security

Any fixed, identifiable premises holding fuel, vehicles or commodities is a looting target regardless of flag or signage.
Front lines move; movement plans built on last week's control map are wrong.
Cross-line movement requires permission from more than one party, and each permission can be withdrawn.

Maritime exposure

Maritime and port exposure is assessed through public shipping notices, port reporting and the Maritime Watch workspace.

Infrastructure and access

Programme criticality review: agree in writing which activities justify presence, and stop the rest.
Minimum footprint, no fuel or vehicle stockpiles at staffed premises; disperse stock; keep cash holdings low and documented.
Cross-line movement only with permissions from every relevant party, confirmed the same day, with a no-go default.

Regional exposure

Front-line movement around Khartoum, El Fasher, El Obeid and the Kordofan corridors.
Drone and air-strike reporting away from established front lines, including Port Sudan.
Aid convoy clearance, cross-border movement from Chad and South Sudan, and visa or travel-permit practice.

Key drivers

War between SAF and RSF · Ethnic targeting in Darfur · Collapse of civil systems · External backing

Indicators

Front-line movement around Khartoum, El Fasher, El Obeid and the Kordofan corridors. · Drone and air-strike reporting away from established front lines, including Port Sudan. · Aid convoy clearance, cross-border movement from Chad and South Sudan, and visa or travel-permit practice.

Limitations

Access to Darfur and Kordofan is severely constrained, so absence of reporting cannot be read as absence of violence. Both belligerents make claims that cannot be verified from open sources.

If it happens

Death and serious injury of staff, including from indirect fire with no attack directed at the organisation at all.
Total loss of assets, stock and premises through looting, and loss of the capacity to deliver at all in an area.
Prolonged detention of staff, and severe welfare consequences for national staff and their dependants.

Rated risks

Ref	Risk	L	I	Rating	Mitigation
SD-A1	Staff killed or injured by indirect fire or air attack in a contested urban area	4	5	CRITICAL	Programme criticality; minimum footprint and staffing; hardened shelter and drills; relocation triggers agreed in advance.
SD-A2	Armed looting of premises, vehicles or warehoused stock	5	4	CRITICAL	Disperse stock; no fuel or vehicle concentration at staffed sites; low visible profile; documented low cash holdings.
SD-A3	Detention or interrogation of staff at a checkpoint or cross-line crossing	4	4	SEVERE	Same-day permissions from every party; documentation discipline; scripted responses; named legal and welfare support.
SD-A4	Death or injury from explosive remnants of war in an area fighting has passed through	3	5	SEVERE	Explosive-ordnance awareness for all staff; mine-action clearance information; rule against entering unswept structures.
SD-A5	National staff and dependants left exposed after international relocation	4	4	SEVERE	Written national-staff support policy agreed before any relocation; salary continuity; relocation options; family contact plan.

Residual risk

Extreme in the conflict-affected states. Presence should be justified activity by activity, with residual risk accepted at board level and reviewed continuously rather than quarterly.

Reliability & Confidence

Reliability: B · Confidence: Moderate. Reporting is credible but partial; access constraints, communications failure and the pace of front-line change mean the picture lags reality.

Sources

· ACLED conflict event data
· UN OCHA situation reports and ReliefWeb country pages
· Insecurity Insight aid-security incident data
· UK FCDO and US State Department travel advice
· National and regional media monitoring
· UN OCHA Sudan flash updates
· Sudan mine-action and explosive-ordnance risk education reporting
· Radio Dabanga and Sudanese media monitoring