Sudan: Geopolitical Risk Assessment, October 2026

Key judgement

Active war between organised military forces, with urban ground fighting, air and artillery use, collapsed services, and humanitarian access determined by front lines and by permissions from the parties.

Sources · [5] FEWS NET · [8] Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa)

Threat context

- Sustained hostilities between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, including indirect fire and air attack affecting residential districts. - Armed looting of humanitarian premises, vehicles, warehouses and convoys, reported repeatedly by agencies. - Detention, harassment and interrogation of aid staff at checkpoints, and pressure on national staff over perceived affiliation. - Explosive remnants of war in areas where fighting has passed, including unexploded ordnance in urban plots and along roads. - Communications and banking collapse in parts of the country, which is a threat to duty of care as much as an inconvenience.

Sources · [10] UKMTO · [1] ACLED

Vulnerabilities

- Any fixed, identifiable premises holding fuel, vehicles or commodities is a looting target regardless of flag or signage. - Front lines move; movement plans built on last week's control map are wrong. - Cross-line movement requires permission from more than one party, and each permission can be withdrawn. - National staff and their families remain in place when international staff relocate, carrying the residual exposure.

Sources · [7] GDELT Project · [10] UKMTO

Exposure

- Khartoum State, Darfur states and Kordofan, where ground fighting and air attack have been concentrated. - Port Sudan and eastern Sudan as the main entry, logistics and relocation route. - Cross-line and cross-border convoy movement, including from Chad and South Sudan.

Sources · [8] Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa) · [11] IOM DTM

Operational implications

- Death and serious injury of staff, including from indirect fire with no attack directed at the organisation at all. - Total loss of assets, stock and premises through looting, and loss of the capacity to deliver at all in an area. - Prolonged detention of staff, and severe welfare consequences for national staff and their dependants.

Sources · [11] IOM DTM · [2] UCDP

Rated risks

- Staff killed or injured by indirect fire or air attack in a contested urban area, likelihood 4/5, impact 5/5. Programme criticality; minimum footprint and staffing; hardened shelter and drills; relocation triggers agreed in advance. - Armed looting of premises, vehicles or warehoused stock, likelihood 5/5, impact 4/5. Disperse stock; no fuel or vehicle concentration at staffed sites; low visible profile; documented low cash holdings. - Detention or interrogation of staff at a checkpoint or cross-line crossing, likelihood 4/5, impact 4/5. Same-day permissions from every party; documentation discipline; scripted responses; named legal and welfare support. - Death or injury from explosive remnants of war in an area fighting has passed through, likelihood 3/5, impact 5/5. Explosive-ordnance awareness for all staff; mine-action clearance information; rule against entering unswept structures. - National staff and dependants left exposed after international relocation, likelihood 4/5, impact 4/5. Written national-staff support policy agreed before any relocation; salary continuity; relocation options; family contact plan.

Sources · [5] FEWS NET · [8] Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa)

Mitigation

- Programme criticality review: agree in writing which activities justify presence, and stop the rest. - Minimum footprint, no fuel or vehicle stockpiles at staffed premises; disperse stock; keep cash holdings low and documented. - Cross-line movement only with permissions from every relevant party, confirmed the same day, with a no-go default. - National staff support built in from the start: relocation options, salary continuity, family contact arrangements, and a decision about what is owed if international staff withdraw. - Explosive-ordnance awareness briefing for all staff, route clearance information from mine-action actors, and a rule against entering unswept damaged buildings. - Relocation and hibernation plans written, resourced and rehearsed, with trigger indicators agreed before they are needed.

Sources · [12] INSO · [3] UN OCHA / ReliefWeb

Residual risk

Extreme in the conflict-affected states. Presence should be justified activity by activity, with residual risk accepted at board level and reviewed continuously rather than quarterly.

Sources · [3] UN OCHA / ReliefWeb · [6] NASA FIRMS / Copernicus

Confidence and sources

Confidence: Moderate. Reporting is credible but partial; access constraints, communications failure and the pace of front-line change mean the picture lags reality.. B

- ACLED[1] conflict event data - UN OCHA[3] situation reports and ReliefWeb country pages - Insecurity Insight aid-security incident data - UK FCDO and US State Department travel advice - National and regional media monitoring - UN OCHA Sudan flash updates - Sudan mine-action and explosive-ordnance risk education reporting - Radio Dabanga and Sudanese media monitoring

Analyst assessment from public sources, Reviewed September 2026. Not a substitute for an organisation's own assessment.

Sources · [6] NASA FIRMS / Copernicus · [9] Mazin Intel analyst desk