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Operations intelligence

Development activity and programme records

Development programmes published to the IATI Registry by funders and implementing organisations, kept at the geographic precision the publisher supplied.

4
Records in view
3
Countries represented
1
Attributed sources
4
Source-backed records

Breakdown

What is in this view

Counts of stored records after the search and region filters above. Record counts show how much a publisher has reported; they are not a measure of programme size, spend or need.

Countries

Records per country in this view.

Sectors

Publisher-stated sector labels.

No stored records match this view yet.

Reporting sources

Which attributed public sources the records came from.

  • Mazin Intel journey management framework4
Key corridors·Somalia·Corridor-level·corridor precisionAnalyst framework

Mogadishu → Baidoa

Principal threats: Armed conflict along contested segments; Roadside explosive devices; Multiple checkpoints of varying authority. Movement controls: Route selection reviewed on the day of travel, not in advance only; Departure timing inside an agreed daylight window.

Source: Mazin Intel journey management framework
Key corridors·Somalia·Corridor-level·corridor precisionAnalyst framework

Mogadishu Aden Adde Airport → city

Principal threats: Complex attack on the arterial road; Explosive devices targeting convoys; Predictable timing of airport transfers. Movement controls: Timing varied and never published in advance; Transfer confirmed only once the passenger is on the ground.

Source: Mazin Intel journey management framework
Key corridors·Kenya·Corridor-level·corridor precisionAnalyst framework

Nairobi → Garissa → Dadaab

Principal threats: Improvised explosive devices on specific segments; Cross-border armed-group activity; Banditry on isolated stretches. Movement controls: Convoy or escort arrangements where required by policy; No night movement.

Source: Mazin Intel journey management framework
Key corridors·Sudan·Corridor-level·corridor precisionAnalyst framework

Port Sudan → inland corridor

Principal threats: Front-line movement across the corridor; Multiple parallel authorities at control points; Cargo interference and diversion. Movement controls: Documentation prepared for every authority on the route; Transporter vetting and briefing.

Source: Mazin Intel journey management framework

How these records are built

  • Activity titles, descriptions, dates and implementing organisations come from IATI publisher data accessed through d-portal.
  • Financial values are not restated here. Where a figure matters, read it from the publisher's own IATI record.
  • A published activity records an intention or a report by its publisher. It is not independent verification that work is under way on the ground.

Queried 22/11/2026, 18:47:59 UTC · 0 demonstration interface records included across the platform

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